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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has traditionally been a country of
opportunity for many legal immigrants. But the process of establishing a
life in their new home country has never been easy on immigrants, who
have historically faced legal discrimination, often in the form of laws
aimed at preventing them from working.1 In Takashi v. Fish &Game
Commission, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he assertion of an
authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when
lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the
right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot
live where they cannot work.”2 Yet today there is a group of legal
immigrants in the United States that are facing precisely this dilemma.
Nonimmigrants, a class of legal aliens who reside in the United States
under temporary visas,3 have recently brought a series of challenges to
laws that have discriminated against them on basis of their legal status.4
Decades after the Supreme Court ruled in Takashi, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals invoked this issue when it concluded that the State of
New York could not prevent immigrants with temporary work visas from

†J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of
Vermont, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Jenny-Brooke Condon for her guidance
and insight during the writing process, as well as my mentors, Christopher Russo and
Mallory Sweeney. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their unwavering
support and love, without which I would not be the person I am today. Finally, thank you
to the Seton Hall Circuit Review and its members for making this Comment possible.
1
Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948).
2
Id. at 416 (striking down a law preventing people of Japanese descent, who were
at the time ineligible for citizenship because of their race, from receiving fishing
licenses).
3
RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 2:23 (2013 ed.).
4
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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becoming licensed pharmacists in the state.5 This ruling was the first in a
series of steps necessary for the court system to prevent state
Further protections for
discrimination against nonimmigrants.6
nonimmigrants are needed, however.7
Courts should evaluate
discriminatory state laws under the Equal Protection Clause using strict
scrutiny review, both because nonimmigrants are a suspect class and
because the Supreme Court has previously ruled that classifications
based on alienage are reviewed using strict scrutiny.8
In 1971, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson considered
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited states from discriminating between residents on the basis of
alien status.9 In doing so, the Supreme Court had to determine whether it
would review the laws under rational basis review, a standard that is very
deferential to the government, or strict scrutiny, the highest level of
Equal Protection review.10 The Court held that “classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”11 After Graham, it appeared that
the debate over whether the Equal Protection clause prohibited alienagebased discrimination might have been resolved.12 In recent years, the
Supreme Court has considered the difference between the rights afforded
to undocumented immigrants versus legal immigrants,13 but has yet to
address what safeguards the Equal Protection Clause affords to
nonimmigrants.14
A question has arisen as to whether Graham’s analysis truly applies
to alienage as a class, or if the Supreme Court merely afforded strict
scrutiny review to one group of legal immigrants, legal permanent
residents, but not to nonimmigrants.15 Three Circuit Courts have
addressed this issue within the last ten years. Both the Fifth and the
Sixth Circuits have concluded that rational basis review applies to laws

5

Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012).
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
7
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
8
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
9
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971).
10
Id at 371–72; see also infra Part II.A.
11
Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
12
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012).
13
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
14
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); see also infra notes 105–15 and
accompanying text.
15
See discussion infra Part III.B.
6
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that discriminate against nonimmigrants.16 These Courts have found that
Graham’s holding only applies to legal permanent residents and not to
nonimmigrants.17 The Second Circuit disagreed in Dandamudi, finding
that Graham’s holding applied to nonimmigrants as well.18 The Second
Circuit thus split from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as to the appropriate
level of review for such claims under the Equal Protection Clause.19 As
a result of these rulings, the legitimacy of laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants varies depending on what part of the country the
nonimmigrant resides in.
This Comment addresses this present circuit split and argues that
courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using
strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. Nonimmigrants are a suspect class, which has
historically warranted the application of a strict scrutiny standard of
review.20 In addition, the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham was
meant to establish strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for
alienage as a whole.21 For these reasons, strict scrutiny is the appropriate
level of review.22 Part II of this Comment contains a brief overview of
immigration law and how it categorizes different classes of immigrants,
as well as a brief discussion of the standards of review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Part III contains an analysis of the Supreme Court
case law on immigration and Equal Protection challenges and a
discussion of the current federal appellate and district court cases
covering challenges to laws that restrict the rights and privileges of
nonimmigrants. Part IV discusses a variety of approaches to preventing
legal discrimination against nonimmigrants and the consequences of each
suggested approach. Finally, Part V concludes that courts should review
laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under the strict scrutiny
standard of review.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

See discussion infra Part III B.1-2.
See discussion infra Part III B.1-2.
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 75–76.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Protection Clause and Levels of Review
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
Equal Protection of the laws.”23 Historically, the Supreme Court applied
the Equal Protection Clause to state laws that discriminated against
different groups in an uneven manner.24 The Court later developed a
more specific method of deciding Equal Protection cases, beginning with
United States v. Carolene Products.25 In footnote four, the Court noted
that it might apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny” to laws depending
on, among other things, whether the law discriminated between
“particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities” or “discrete
and insular minorities.”26 The Supreme Court later adopted the idea that
it is appropriate to apply different levels of scrutiny to laws depending on
what groups the laws distinguish between.27 The Court eventually
developed three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate or
heightened scrutiny, and rational basis.28
Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of Equal Protection
review. To pass review under strict scrutiny, the proponent of the law
must show that they are pursuing a compelling government interest and
that the law is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve this interest.29
The courts will apply strict scrutiny review to classifications based on
race or national origin.30 The Supreme Court has also applied strict
scrutiny review to classifications based on alienage,31 though whether
such classifications always trigger strict scrutiny review is, of course, the
subject of continued debate.32 Rational basis is the lowest level of
scrutiny and is the default applied by the courts in absence of a reason for
a heightened level of scrutiny.33 For this standard of review, courts
23

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAWSUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 18.3(a)(i) (5th ed. 2012).
25
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
26
Id.
27
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(v).
28
Id.
29
Id. at § 12.3(a)(iii).
30
Id.
31
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971);infra Part III.A.1.
32
See infra Part III.B.
33
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(ii).
24

204

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:199

evaluate only whether the classification has a rational relationship to
some legitimate end that the government is pursuing.34 The Supreme
Court has also applied an intermediate level of scrutiny in some cases,
such as those discriminating on the basis of gender.35 While the specific
formulation varies, intermediate scrutiny generally requires a court to
evaluate whether there is an important government objective that is
substantially related to the government action at issue.36 In certain
circumstances, the Supreme Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny
to undocumented immigrants.37
The appropriate level of classification is determined by evaluating
whether the group in question is a “suspect class” for the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause.38 The Court will look at a variety of factors,
such as if the class is a “discrete and insular minority”39 or has been
“subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness,” to determine whether a
class is suspect .40 If a court finds that the group in question is a suspect
class, it will apply strict scrutiny review.41 If the group has some of the
characteristics of a suspect class, a court may choose to apply a
heightened form of scrutiny.42 But if the class is not suspect, it is
unlikely that a court will apply anything other than rational basis
Courts generally give a strong presumption of
scrutiny.43
constitutionality to laws reviewed under rational basis.44 Therefore,
heightened levels of scrutiny are far more advantageous to plaintiffs
challenging these classifications.45
B. The Classification of Aliens Under United States Law
United States immigration law divides aliens into three major
categories: legal permanent residents, undocumented immigrants, and
nonimmigrants.46 The first category contains legal permanent residents
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iv).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see infra Part III.A.2.
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iii).
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iii).
Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv).
Id. at § 18.3(a)(ii).
Id. at § 18.3(a)(v).
Id.
STEEL, supra note 3, at § 2:23.
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(herein “LPRs”).47 Also referred to simply as immigrants, LPRs have the
intention to stay in the United States permanently.48 LPRs obtain legal
permits, often referred to as green cards, which allow them to remain in
the United States permanently.49 LPRs can achieve permanent resident
status through a variety of means, though the most common include
“through family relationships, through a job, or as a refugee or asylee.”50
The second category of aliens is undocumented immigrants or “illegal
aliens.” Undocumented immigrants generally have fewer legal rights due
to their illegal status.51
The final category of immigrants is nonimmigrants, who are
temporary, legal aliens.52 Nonimmigrants come to the United States “to
engage in an activity encompassed within one of the nonimmigrant
classifications set forth in the [Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”)(8 U.S.C.A. § 1184)].” 53 They are required to establish
“eligibility within one of the principal nonimmigrant classifications or
one of the subclassifications” in order to qualify for a visa.54 The
category covers a variety of individuals, such as “temporary workers,
students, foreign diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.”55 The INA
only permits nonimmigrants to remain in the United States for a finite
period, though that period varies depending on the type of nonimmigrant
visa.56
This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants; specifically, those
nonimmigrants that are in the United States for a longer period of time,
such as those with work or student visas. There are several types of
student visas. Nonimmigrants can attend a college program with an F-1
visa, while Mexican and Canadian students can receive an F-3 visa for a
similar purpose.57 The INA also provides for a variety of temporary
work visas, including H-1B and H-1C visas.58 Additionally, “TN”
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at § 2:24.
51
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1982).
52
STEEL, supra note 3, at § 2:23.
53
Id. at § 3.1.
54
Id. at § 2.28.
55
Justin Storch, Legal Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed
Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 13 (2011).
56
STEEL, supra note 3, at § 3:12.
57
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(F)
(2012); 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2012); see also STEEL, supra note 3, at § 3:12.
58
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2012).
48
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immigrants are a class of nonimmigrants created under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).59 Workers with H-1B, H1C, and TN visas typically stay in the United States for an initial period
of three years, and can later receive a three-year extension of the initial
period.60 Thus, the work period is technically restricted to six years.61
But many nonimmigrants remain in the country for longer, as “federal
law permits many aliens with TN or H1-B status to maintain their
temporary worker authorization for a period greater than six years.”62
Generally, nonimmigrants enter the United States on a temporary basis
and must attest that they do not intend to remain in the United States past
the time allowed by their visa63
Of particular note to this comment are nonimmigrants with longerterm visas, such as work and student visas. The limited federal case law
on nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause involves challenges
brought by nonimmigrants with work and student visas, who are usually
the target of the discriminatory laws.64 While the analysis of this
Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas, its conclusions are
applicable more broadly to nonimmigrants as a whole, who are generally
in a legally vulnerable position because their status under the
Constitution is unclear.65 As such, the conclusion that their vulnerable
position merits suspect class status can be applied to all nonimmigrants.66
III. IMMIGRATION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE
COURTS
A. Supreme Court Precedent on Alienage
1. Early Rulings on Alienage: Graham v. Richardson and its
Progeny
The Supreme Court initially determined the level of Equal
Protection review afforded to aliens in Graham v. Richardson. In
Graham, the Court examined Arizona and Pennsylvania laws that
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

8 C.F.R. § 214.6.
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 71.
Id.
Storch, supra note 55, at 13.
See infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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restricted welfare benefits to citizens and long-term residents.67 The
Court referred to the plaintiffs, who all had some form of LPR status, as
“lawfully admitted residents.”68 Arizona and Pennsylvania argued that
the Constitution permitted states to “favor United States citizens over
aliens” and that doing so did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.69
The plaintiffs argued that preventing aliens from accessing welfare
benefits on an equal basis as their citizen counterparts was
unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection Clause and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.70
The Court stated that the restrictive welfare laws “create two
classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to
whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”71
Invoking
Carolene Products Co.’s famous footnote four, the Court found that
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’
minority . . . for
whom . . . heightened
judicial
solicitude
is
appropriate.”72 The Court therefore concluded that its decisions had
“established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny.”73 While acknowledging that it had occasionally upheld
statutes that distinguished between citizens and immigrants, the Court
found that those distinctions had been necessary to protect specific
“special interests of the State or its citizens.”74 Under the circumstances
presented in the case, the Court held that the “State’s desire to preserve
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens” was not a special interest
sufficient to justify the state’s discrimination against the plaintiffs.75
The Supreme Court focused on LPRs in its analysis and used the
terms “resident aliens” and “lawful aliens” interchangeably throughout
the opinion.76 The Supreme Court also relied on the similarities between
LPRs and citizens to support its conclusions.77 It held that “[a]liens like
citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces,” and that
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1971).
Id. at 367–70.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371–72.
Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 367–70.
Id. at 376.
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“[u]nlike the short-term residents . . . aliens may live within a state for
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of
the state.”78 The Court distinguished “short-term residents” from
permanent aliens, who share more in common with citizens.79 The
Supreme Court further noted that states cannot argue that citizens have a
special interest in tax revenue spent on citizens themselves when “aliens
have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.”80 By
specifically framing the issue around the characteristics of LPRs, the
Court may have been limiting its holding to that specific group of
aliens.81 As such, the holding would exclude nonimmigrants, and laws
discriminating against them would only be subject to rational basis
review.82 Nevertheless, some scholars and at least one court have
concluded that the Supreme Court intended its holding in Graham to
apply to alienage in general, thus applying a strict scrutiny standard of
review to classifications affecting all classes of legal immigrants.83
Others have argued that the holding in Graham applied only to LPRs and
not to nonimmigrants.84 These differing interpretations of Graham are
the basis of the current circuit split over the level of Equal Protection
review granted to nonimmigrants.85
Following Graham, the Court addressed a variety of other Equal
Protection challenges to state laws that discriminated on the basis of
alienage. In In re Griffiths, the Court struck down a Connecticut law
limiting admission to the bar to citizens.86 The plaintiff in Griffiths, as in
Graham, was an alien that had LPR status.87 In concluding that the
Connecticut law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Griffiths Court
affirmed that “[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on
78

Id.
Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
80
Id.
81
See generally LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St.
Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Bredesen (LULAC), 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).
82
See supra note 81.
83
See generally Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012); Kirk v. N.Y. State
Dep. Of Educ., 562 F.Supp.2d 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice For All?
The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 759 (2010).
84
See generally LeClerc, 419 F.3d 405; Van Staden. 664 F.3d 56; LULAC,,500 F.3d
523,; Wall, supra note 83. .
85
See discussion infra Part III.B.
86
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
87
Id.
79
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nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny.”88 As in Graham, the Court also emphasized the similarities
between LPRs and citizens to support its holding.89 The Griffiths Court
stated that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other
ways to our society” and therefore the state “bear[s] a heavy burden
when it deprives them of employment opportunities.”90 The Supreme
Court cited these same factors to support the decision in Graham.91 In a
later case, the Court again cited to these same factors in ruling that state
financial aid statutes could not discriminate against certain classes of
resident aliens.92 It specifically noted in Nyquist that resident aliens had
to pay “their full share of taxes” and, as such, the law disproportionately
burdened them over similarly-situated citizens.93 These subsequent
decisions reinforced the view that the Supreme Court, in focusing on the
characteristics of LPRs, intended to limit its holding to LPRs alone. But
the Court did not use these cases as an opportunity to explicitly establish
that the holding in Graham was limited. Therefore, Graham’s progeny
merely added to the controversy over the extent of Graham’s protection
without resolving the issue.
2. Undocumented Immigrants and Plyler v. Doe
Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws under the
Equal Protection clause, with varying degrees of success. The Supreme
Court ruled on such a claim in Plyler v. Doe, a case examining the
legality of a school admissions policy that restricted the registration of
children of undocumented immigrants.94 In Plyler, the Court initially
dismissed the idea that undocumented aliens are a suspect class.95
Specifically, the Court held that an individual’s undocumented status
does not permit the same level of constitutional protections afforded to
legal aliens.96 Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to
apply rational basis review in the case.97
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1977).
Id. at 12.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
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But the Plyler Court went on to emphasize that the class at issue in
the case was the children of undocumented immigrants, not just
undocumented immigrants in general.98 The Court stated that the law at
issue “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for their disabling status.”99 The Court therefore required
the state to point to a “substantial goal” furthered by the law.100 While
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it would use rational basis
review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was
actually applying some form of heightened scrutiny.101 Ultimately, the
Court struck down the restrictions on undocumented immigrant children
under this heightened standard.102
The Plyler decision complicated the analysis of how the Equal
Protection Clause is used to review laws that discriminate on the basis of
alienage by potentially introducing a third level of scrutiny. The Supreme
Court stated in Plyler that it was applying rational basis review to the
case.103 Plyler’s holding, however, seemed to actually apply a form of
heightened review to undocumented immigrants as a class.104 As a
result, courts now have three levels of scrutiny that could potentially
apply to aliens. The Plyler Court emphasized the fact that the
undocumented immigrants at issue were children who were in a
particularly vulnerable position through no fault of their own.105 The
Court’s focus on the vulnerability of children implies that intermediate
scrutiny would not usually apply to undocumented aliens. Therefore, the
actual holding of Plyler may be narrower than it first appears.
3. Nonimmigrants and Toll v. Moreno
The Supreme Court has only decided one case that contained an
Equal Protection challenge to a law that discriminated against
nonimmigrants: Toll v. Moreno.106 Toll involved the University of
98

Id.
Id.
100
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
101
See id.
102
Id. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such
showing was made here.”).
103
See id. at 224.
104
See id.
105
Id.
106
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3 (1982); see also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405,
416 (5th Cir. 2005).
99
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Maryland’s decision to grant preferential tuition to students with a
domicile in Maryland.107 Only citizens or LPRs with domicile, however,
The university policy excluded
could receive these benefits.108
nonimmigrants from these benefits, even if the particular type of visa the
nonimmigrant held allowed them to establish domicile in the state.109
Nonimmigrant students challenged the law, arguing that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against nonimmigrants as a
class in favor of citizens and LPRs.110 The plaintiffs argued in the
alternative that federal immigration law, which designated that
nonimmigrants with G-4 visas could establish domiciles, preempted the
Maryland statute.111
Without addressing the Equal Protection argument, the Supreme
Court struck down the law on preemption grounds.112 The Court held
that it “[had] no occasion to consider whether the policy violates
the . . . Equal Protection Clause.”113 The holding itself was very narrow,
dealing only with a very small subset of nonimmigrants that were
explicitly granted domicile status.114 The Court did not even consider the
Equal Protection arguments.115 The Court seemed to avoid any
discussion of the issue beyond recounting the District Court’s ruling
below.116 As such, the question as to whether the Graham analysis
should apply to nonimmigrants remained open following Toll.
B. Circuit Courts Challenges to Laws Discriminating Against
Nonimmigrants
The federal circuits have only occasionally addressed challenges to
laws discriminating against nonimmigrants.117 These cases have arisen
107

Toll, 458 U.S. at 3–4.
Id.
109
Id. at 3.
110
Id. at 4.
111
Id. at 3.
112
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10–17. The Court held that Congress has expressly permitted the
classes of nonimmigrants in question here to “establish domicile.” Id. Maryland was not
permitted to remove this domicile status, as the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
made federal law preempt state law. Id. The Court “note[d] the substantial limitations
upon the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage” in
deciding Toll. Id.
113
Id. at 10.
114
Id. at 17.
115
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10.
116
Id.
117
For a discussion on these cases in their totality see discussion infra.
108
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within the last ten years and are concentrated within three circuits: the
Fifth, the Sixth, and the Second.118 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have
held that courts should consider laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants under rational basis review.119 Very recently, the Second
Circuit has disagreed with its fellow circuit courts, holding that strict
scrutiny review is appropriate for reviewing laws that restrict the
employment of nonimmigrants.120 Accordingly, there is currently a split
amongst the circuits as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied
in Equal Protection challenges to laws that exclude nonimmigrants.
1. The Fifth Circuit: LeClerc v. Webb and Van Staden v. St. Martin
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit court
to examine what level of scrutiny nonimmigrants should receive under
the Equal Protection Clause.121 LeClerc addressed an Equal Protection
challenge to a Louisiana law restricting state bar exam admissions to
citizens and LPRs.122 The class of plaintiffs, from two consolidated
cases, held several different types of nonimmigrant visas, including J-1
student visas and H-1B work visas.123 Several of the plaintiffs had
entered the United States under one of these types of visas but had then
transitioned to others.124 The plaintiffs maintained that the law violated
their Equal Protection rights by distinguishing their legal treatment from
that of citizens and LPRs.125 The plaintiffs argued that the law should
either be evaluated under strict scrutiny analysis because “under In re
Griffiths, nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class and state laws affecting
them are subject to strict scrutiny,” or, at a minimum, under intermediate
scrutiny because “nonimmigrant aliens are a quasi-suspect class.”126 The
Fifth Circuit dismissed these arguments and held that rational basis was
the appropriate level of review.127

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

See discussion infra..
See discussion infra.
See generally Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 410–11.
Id.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415.
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As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the holding
in In re Griffiths128 was not applicable because it addressed
discrimination against an LPR alien, and not whether strict scrutiny
review applied to nonimmigrants.129 The court held that the differences
between nonimmigrants and LPRs were “paramount.”130 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Griffiths, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, turned on the
fact that “resident aliens share essential benefits and burdens of
citizenship . . . in a way that aliens with lesser legal status do not.”131 As
such, the court concluded that Griffiths forbade the “total exclusion” of
aliens in general, but did not forbid the exclusion of some classes of
aliens.132
The Fifth Circuit then considered two additional arguments: (1) that
nonimmigrants constituted a suspect class for the purposes of Equal
Protection analysis, and (2) that laws restricting nonimmigrants in
general should receive strict scrutiny as a default.133 The court held that
while alienage classifications are “subject to close judicial scrutiny as a
general matter,” not all such classifications are inherently invalid or
suspect.134 After Graham, the court noted, non-LPR aliens had only
received rational basis review or, in the rare case of Plyler, heightened
review.135 Further, the court held that the plaintiffs in Plyler only
received heightened review because they were children and as such
Plyler represented an outlier.136
The court reasoned that the distinct traits of LPR status meant that
such aliens were entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny, while
nonimmigrants, lacking these traits, were not.137 Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has emphasized two conditions of
LPRs that justified the application of strict scrutiny to laws that affected
them: “(1) the inability of resident aliens to exert political power in their
own interest given their status as virtual citizens; and (2) the similarity of

128
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prevent LPRs from sitting for the bar solely because of their alien status. See In re
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resident aliens and citizens.”138 In contrast, nonimmigrants, “who
ordinarily stipulate . . . that they have no intention of abandoning their
native citizenship,” did not merit “the extraordinary protection” that strict
scrutiny provides.139 The Fifth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on
nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection” to the United States.140 The
court concluded that “[a]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general,
they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the
proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class.”141 The Fifth
Circuit therefore held that the Supreme Court did not intend for
nonimmigrants to receive a higher level of scrutiny and “decline[d] to
extend the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning resident aliens to
different alien categories when the Court itself has shied away from such
expansion.”142 The court reviewed the state bar exam restrictions under
rational basis review and ultimately upheld them.143
The majority in LeClerc upheld the regulations on all grounds.144
But in his dissent, Judge Stewart departed from the majority’s decision to
apply rational basis review.145 Judge Stewart differed with the majority’s
interpretation of Graham, noting that “the Supreme Court’s statement
that ‘alienage is a suspect class’ by definition includes nonimmigrant
aliens as part of that class.”146 The Supreme Court did not restrict its
ruling in Graham to LPRs, Judge Stewart maintained, even though the
Court used language referring to resident aliens.147 Judge Stewart stated
that “the Supreme Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and noncitizens interchangeably,” and therefore “residence and immigration
status should be understood as two separate distinctions; one does not
necessarily have to do with the other.”148 According to the dissent, the
Graham Court held that alienage in general was a suspect class.149
Judge Stewart also disagreed with the way the majority
distinguished nonimmigrants as a distinct class from LPRs.150 He argued
138
139
140
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that the distinction between the two classes was not great enough to
warrant different treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.151
Instead, there were enough similarities between LPRs and
nonimmigrants in important areas–such as the inability to vote and a
history of discrimination–to warrant nonimmigrants’ inclusion as a
suspect class.152 Judge Stewart also dismissed the alleged “transience” of
nonimmigrant aliens, noting that “not all nonimmigrant aliens are
required to keep a permanent residence abroad,” nor were they forbidden
from intending to stay in the United States.153 The judge pointed to the
State Department’s acceptance of the doctrine of dual intent, which
permitted nonimmigrant aliens to “express a short term intent to remain
in the United States temporarily (so as to not contravene the
requirements of the visa under which they entered)” as well as “a long
term intent to remain in the United States permanently (so that they may
apply for adjustment of status).”154 The acceptance of dual intent showed
that even the government acknowledged that nonimmigrants were not, as
a group, transient.155 Judge Stewart concluded that “[t]he presumption
should be that nonimmigrant aliens are part of the alien suspect class and
the defendants should have the burden of proving the opposite.”156
Six years after LeClerc, the question of the scope of Equal
Protection rights for nonimmigrants was again before the Fifth Circuit in
Van Staden v. St. Martin.157 Van Staden addressed the constitutionality
of licensing restriction for nurses in Louisiana.158 Van Staden, a nurse
authorized to work in the United States who was in the process of
applying for LPR status, challenged a law allowing only LPRs and
citizens to apply for nursing licenses.159 At the outset, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the case was “controlled by LeClerc.”160 The Fifth
Circuit held that “[n]onimmigrant aliens satisfy neither of the conditions
triggering strict scrutiny,” because nonimmigrants were neither discrete
nor insular, had varied admission statuses, and lacked political capacity
151
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due only to their temporary status.161 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
further concluded that applicants for LPR status should count as
nonimmigrants for the purposes of Equal Protection challenges, and
should not receive the same treatment as full-fledged LPRs.162 The Fifth
Circuit thus applied rational basis review to the law and ultimately
upheld the restrictions.163
As the first cases to deal with laws discriminating against
nonimmigrants, the Fifth Circuit’s rulings were particularly troubling.
Both LeClerc and Van Staden established that nonimmigrants would not
fall under the protections of Graham or the Court’s other alienage
decisions.164 States within the Fifth Circuit were thus free to limit the
ability of nonimmigrants to work in certain fields. In the interim
between the rulings in LeClerc and Van Staden, the Sixth Circuit joined
the Fifth in ruling that laws discriminating against nonimmigrants would
be evaluated under rational basis review.165
2. The Sixth Circuit: LULAC v. Bredesen
In the Sixth Circuit, the issue regarding the scope of Equal
Protection rights for nonimmigrants arose in League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen.166 In LULAC, the Sixth Circuit
agreed with the Fifth Circuit by holding that state restrictions on
nonimmigrants were not subject to strict scrutiny review.167 Unlike the
Fifth Circuit cases, which addressed laws restricting employment,
LULAC considered a law preventing nonimmigrants from receiving
driver’s licenses.168 LULAC, a non-profit organization concerned with
Hispanic rights, sued on behalf of its members, in addition to several
individuals who could not obtain driver’s licenses due to their
nonimmigrant status.169 The plaintiffs alleged that the law discriminated
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against them based on their nonimmigrant status and that such
discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause.170
Relying heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in LeClerc, the Sixth
Circuit agreed that nonimmigrants are dissimilar as a class from LPRs.171
The LULAC majority found that “there are abundant good reasons, both
legal and pragmatic, why lawful permanent residents are the only
subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect class.”172 The court
reasoned that the case at hand did not provide any “compelling reason”
to extend “the special protection afforded by suspect-class recognition”
to nonimmigrants.173 It also dismissed the argument that subsequent
Supreme Court cases, such as Nyquist, indicated that the Graham Court
intended to extend strict scrutiny review to all classifications based on
alienage.174
The Sixth Circuit concluded that as “the instant
classification does not result in discriminatory harm to members of a
suspect class,” rational basis was the appropriate standard to apply.175
In a counterpoint to the LULAC opinion, Judge Gilman argued in
his dissent that strict scrutiny review was the proper standard of Equal
Protection review for laws that discriminated against nonimmigrants.176
The judge fundamentally disagreed with the majority opinions in both
LULAC and LeClerc, arguing that the Supreme Court intended Graham’s
holding to apply to nonimmigrants.177 While acknowledging that the
Court had “never specifically held that temporary resident legal aliens, as
a subset of all aliens, are a suspect class for equal-protection purposes,”
Judge Gilman deemed such silence irrelevant.178 Rather, he noted that
the Graham majority had not restricted its analysis to LPRs exclusively,
but had instead applied its reasoning to alienage classifications
generally.179
Judge Gilman further criticized the majority’s reliance on LeClerc,
noting that it had adopted the LeClerc opinion “without even mentioning
the numerous criticisms to which that analysis has been subject.”180 In
170
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invoking Judge Stewart’s dissent in LeClerc, Judge Gilman stated that
the majority had failed to address both that dissent and the other
criticisms that the majority opinion had been subject to.181 Judge Gilman
concluded that extending strict scrutiny review to nonimmigrants would
not be expanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham, but would
merely apply the decision as the Court intended it.182
The Sixth Circuit added its voice to the Fifth in rejecting the
application of heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against
nonimmigrants.183 The LULAC opinion did not add substantially to the
legal reasoning behind such a suggestion, as it mostly reiterated points
already made by the LeClerc majority.184 The ruling was important in
that it expanded the number of circuits denying heightened scrutiny. The
only two circuits that had considered this question agreed in their
conclusions.185 Only later when the Second Circuit ruled would a
disagreement emerge among the federal circuits as to the proper level of
scrutiny that should be applied.186
3. The Second Circuit: Dandamudi v. Tisch and the Circuit Split
Prior to the summer of 2012, the federal circuit courts were in
limited agreement that courts should review laws that discriminated
against nonimmigrants under rational basis review.187 But in Dandamudi
v. Tisch, the Second Circuit departed from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in
ruling that such laws should instead be subject to strict scrutiny
review.188 It did so on two grounds: (1) that the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Graham meant that all classifications based on alienage were subject
to strict scrutiny and (2) that nonimmigrants had all the characteristics of
a suspect class and strict scrutiny must therefore be applied.189
Prior to Dandamudi, the Second Circuit seemed receptive to the
idea that strict scrutiny should apply to nonimmigrant Equal Protection
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claims.190 In 2008, the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York in Kirk v. New York State Department of Education
considered whether a law restricting veterinarian licenses to citizens and
LPRs violated the Equal Protection rights of an alien with a TN
temporary work visa.191 The district court considered both the Fifth and
Sixth Circuit majority opinions and dissents.192 It rejected the theory that
the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Graham to LPRs.193
Rather, the court concluded that “the challenged statute must be
reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard” and that the law “fail[ed] to
pass such scrutiny.”194 The Second Circuit never had the opportunity to
review the decision in Kirk, however, as the plaintiff received LPR status
shortly after prevailing in the district court.195
One year later, the Second Circuit had another chance to address
the scope of nonimmigrants’ Equal Protection rights in the case of
Dandamudi v. Tisch.196 Dandamudi addressed the constitutionality of a
New York law that prevented nonimmigrants from obtaining pharmacist
licenses.197 The law required pharmacists to either be citizens of the
United States or legal permanent residents.198 Although the law
originally provided an exception allowing nonimmigrants to work as
pharmacists, that provision had expired in 2006 and the legislature did
not renew it.199 As a result, a number of nonimmigrants previously
licensed as pharmacists in New York brought suit, arguing that the new
restrictions violated their Equal Protection rights under the
Constitution.200
There were two types of nonimmigrant work visas at issue in
Dandamudi: H1-B visas, which fall under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and TN visas under NAFTA.201 These visas permitted
the workers to stay in the United States for six years under the initial visa
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and the extension.202 Federal law permitted them to stay longer and as a
result “[a]ll plaintiffs in this case . . . ha[d] been legally authorized to
reside and work in the United States for more than six years.”203
Additionally, twenty-two of the plaintiffs had applied for LPR status at
the time that the court decided Dandamudi.204
The Second Circuit began by stating that “[t]here is no question that
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all aliens.”205 The court then
proceeded to discuss Graham, concluding that while the Supreme Court
had not explicitly applied strict scrutiny to nonimmigrant aliens, “the
Court has never held that lawfully admitted aliens are outside of
Graham’s protection.”206 In support of its position, the court pointed
Nyquist and In re Griffiths, where the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its
ruling in Graham without limiting it to LPRs.207 Indeed, the Second
Circuit observed that “the Court has never distinguished between classes
of legal resident aliens.”208 While the Supreme Court had carved out
other exceptions to Graham, the court noted, it had never done so for
nonimmigrants.209 The Second Circuit therefore rejected the argument
that Graham’s analysis did not apply to nonimmigrants.210
The Second Circuit also addressed the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’
position in LeClerc, Van Staden, and LULAC.211 The court rejected their
rationale for three reasons. First, the court rejected the notion that the
Supreme Court’s discussion of “the similarities between citizens and
aliens” in Graham had articulated “a test for determining when state
discrimination against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject
to strict scrutiny.”212 The Supreme Court was merely supporting its point
in listing those factors, the Second Circuit noted, and was not creating an
exhaustive test.213 The court further reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits’ argument that Graham’s language limited its holding to LPRs
“reveals the danger of separating the words of an opinion from the
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context in which they were employed.”214 In the Second Circuit’s view,
the Supreme Court was merely stating that “LPRs and citizens have
much in common [and that] treating them differently does not pass
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment.”215 The Second Circuit held
that “[t]he converse of this rationale, however, does not become a litmus
test for determining whether a particular group of aliens is a suspect
class.”216
Second, the Second Circuit reasoned that “nonimmigrant aliens are
but one subclass of aliens, and the Supreme Court recognizes aliens
generally as a discrete and insular minority without significant political
clout.”217 The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Graham had
not distinguished between different subclasses of aliens, but rather
between legal and illegal aliens.218 Graham’s language specifically
spoke to alienage as a general class and not to LPRs only.219 Therefore,
the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ narrow
reading of Graham.220
Finally, the court found that even if it were to decide the
appropriate level of scrutiny based on nonimmigrants’ similarity to
citizens, it would still apply strict scrutiny “because nonimmigrant aliens
are sufficiently similar to citizens that discrimination against them in the
context presented here must be strictly scrutinized.”221 The Second
Circuit pointed to a myriad of characteristics common to both
nonimmigrants and citizens, including that nonimmigrants pay taxes
“often on the same terms as citizens and LPRs” and that many
nonimmigrants also had a far more permanent connection to the United
States than other courts had acknowledged.222 Specifically, the court
rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ dismissal of nonimmigrants as a
discrete and insular minority partially due to the fact that nonimmigrants
could only stay in the United States for six years and had to promise that
they did not intend to remain permanently in the United States.223
Acknowledging that many nonimmigrants do, in fact, stay in the United
214
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States longer, the court pointed to the dual intent doctrine, which
provided that nonimmigrants could express both “an intent to remain
temporarily” under the their work visas and “an intent to remain
permanently” by applying for LPR status.224 The Second Circuit
therefore concluded that “[t]he aliens at issue here are ‘transient’ in name
The court reasoned that “[a] great number of these
only.”225
professionals remain in the United States for much longer than six years
and many ultimately apply for, and obtain, permanent residence. These
practicalities are not irrelevant.”226 Acknowledging that the Supreme
Court applied heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants in
Plyler, the Second Circuit also saw “no reason to create an exception to
the Supreme Court’s precedent that would result in such illogical results”
by applying a lower level of scrutiny to nonimmigrants than was applied
to undocumented immigrants.227 Accordingly, finding “little or no
distinction between LPRs and the lawfully admitted nonimmigrant
plaintiffs [in Dandamudi],” the court held that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in the present case.228
The opinion in Dandamudi makes it very clear that the Second
Circuit found the Fifth and Sixth Circuits to have misapplied Supreme
Court precedent to the issue at hand. 229 As a result, what had previously
been a settled, if limited, issue of law became a circuit split. As it stands,
the question of what level of scrutiny laws discriminating against
nonimmigrants should be evaluated under has two very distinctly
different answers. For the reasons argued below, the Second Circuit is
clearly correct in its holding that such laws must be subject to strict
scrutiny under existing Equal Protection jurisprudence.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Case for Strict Scrutiny
The Second Circuit is the first circuit court to hold that the Equal
Protection Clause requires courts to review laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants under a strict scrutiny level of review.230 Even prior to
224
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Dandamudi, dissenting judges and scholars had argued that rational basis
was not the appropriate level scrutiny for nonimmigrants.231 The Second
Circuit’s ruling incorporated many of the arguments made previously by
both commentators and the dissenters in LULAC and LeClerc. As the
subsequent discussion will show, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level
of review for laws restricting the rights of nonimmigrants. Graham and
its subsequent expansions strongly suggest that the Supreme Court
requires the application of strict scrutiny to classifications based on
alienage. In addition, strict scrutiny review of laws that discriminate
against nonimmigrants is necessary to protect a vulnerable class of legal
aliens.
1. The Proper Application of Graham
Graham extended strict scrutiny review to all classes of aliens, not
only to LPRs. It is true that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham
focused on LPRs and their characteristics and that the opinion did not
mention nonimmigrants explicitly.232 The Court stated that “short term”
aliens did not share the same characteristics as citizens and LPRs, but it
did not define what it meant by “short term.”233 The Court may have
made this distinction with the intent to separate nonimmigrants as a
whole from LPRs, or to distinguish nonimmigrants with shorter term
visas. While the Supreme Court did not decide this point conclusively,
its opinion did not explicitly exclude nonimmigrants.234 The Court did,
however, state in Graham that laws discriminating against “alienage” as
a class should be subject to strict scrutiny review.235 This language
implies that the holding was broad, not restrictive. The Supreme Court
likely focused on LPRs in Graham purely because the plaintiffs in the
case were all LPRs.
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As Judge Gilman argued in his dissent in LULAC, the Supreme
Court’s silence on nonimmigrants in Graham “proves little.”236 While
the Supreme Court may not have specifically discussed nonimmigrants
in Graham, it did not explicitly leave them out either. Indeed, in using
such broad language regarding alienage, the Court may have meant to
include nonimmigrants.237 Had the Court wanted to limit its holding to
LPRs, it could have explicitly stated this rather than using general
language about alienage. The Supreme Court’s silence in Toll, its only
case presenting an Equal Protection question on nonimmigrants, neither
confirms nor denies that strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of
review.238
Importantly, the Court has only explicitly excluded
undocumented immigrants from its holding in Graham, but it did so
largely due to their illegal status in the country.239 The Fifth and Sixth
Circuits found that the list of similarities between citizens and LPRs in
Graham shows that Graham applies only to LPRs.240 But the Second
Circuit disagreed, holding that “nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently
similar to citizens that discrimination against them . . . must be strictly
scrutinized.”241 Thus, the Second Circuit showed that the Graham
analysis logically encompasses nonimmigrants as well as LPRs.242
Contrarily, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ position that the Supreme Court
used language in Graham meant to exclude nonimmigrants has no
textual support.243 The silence of the Court on the issue and its previous
rulings are strong support for the proposition that the Supreme Court
intended its holding in Graham to apply to alienage as a whole, including
nonimmigrants.
2. Nonimmigrants as a Suspect Class
Even if Graham’s holding is limited to LPRs, nonimmigrants still
deserve strict scrutiny review. As the Second Circuit and dissenting
judges in LeClerc and LULAC that addressed this issue have suggested,
236
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nonimmigrants should be considered a suspect class for the purposes of
Equal Protection review.244 As such, the courts should review laws
discriminating against nonimmigrants under strict scrutiny review.
One common characteristic of a suspect class is the class’ inability
to utilize the political process.245 The LeClerc majority suggested that,
because nonimmigrants as a class are so varied, one cannot state that as a
group they are unable to access the political process.246 But the variety
of nonimmigrant visas available is irrelevant to whether nonimmigrants
as a whole are unable to access the political process as easily as
citizens.247 Because of their legal status in the country, nonimmigrants
are just as separated from the political process as LPRs, if not more so.
248

Another argument that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class
involves the lack of “permanency” within the class of nonimmigrants.249
The Fifth Circuit tied nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection to this
country” with their lack of legal capacity to conclude that nonimmigrants
do not warrant suspect class status.250 The Fifth Circuit held that
nonimmigrants are transient and have no permanent ties to the United
States because they are required to maintain foreign citizenship and not
remain in the United States.251 This is an overly literal interpretation of
immigration law and the permanency of nonimmigrant residence. The
Second Circuit disagreed with this interpretation, and found that most
nonimmigrants end up staying legally in the United States for longer
periods of time and that many ultimately receive LPR status.252 The
Second Circuit noted that one of the plaintiffs in the district court case
preceding Dandamudi was dismissed during the appeals process because
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he had received a green card.253 The previous Second Circuit district
court case, Kirk, was also dismissed for this reason.254
Nonimmigrants are a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause. They are politically impotent, facing many of the same problems
and prejudices as LPRs.255 Furthermore, the lack of permanency of
nonimmigrants is an illusion, dispelled by the reality that many end up
staying in the United States legally for a long period of time, ultimately
receiving LPR status.256 Therefore, courts should review laws
discriminating against nonimmigrants under strict scrutiny review.
B.

Intermediate Scrutiny as a Viable Alternative

Short of reviewing classifications based upon nonimmigrant status
under strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny might appropriately apply to
nonimmigrants.257 One could argue that if undocumented immigrants
benefit from heightened scrutiny under Plyler, nonimmigrants deserve at
least the same standard of review.258 Although the Supreme Court stated
it was only using rational basis review in Plyler, under a closer reading it
seems that the Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny.259 But this
argument is premised on the assumption that the Supreme Court was
granting heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants as a whole,
and not merely applying it because the challenge involved children.260
The Court’s focus on the vulnerability of children in particular may
indicate that the holding is very narrow.261 If Plyler’s holding is limited
only to cases involving undocumented immigrant children, or even only
undocumented immigrant children’s education, its holding does not
include undocumented immigrants as a whole.262 In that case, it seems
likely that the court would merely apply rational basis review to laws
discriminating against undocumented immigrants, as they purported to
do in Plyler.263 If this is the true holding of Plyler, then the argument
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that heightened scrutiny should be applied to cases involving
nonimmigrants because it is the standard used for undocumented
immigrants no longer exists.
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court ever rejects the application of
strict scrutiny to nonimmigrants, intermediate scrutiny review would still
be a preferable alternative to rational basis review. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to several other classes that it
deemed not “discrete and insular” enough to receive strict scrutiny, but
that deserved a lever of scrutiny that is slightly higher than rational basis
review.264 Therefore, it is plausible that the Supreme Court would chose
to apply heightened scrutiny to nonimmigrants. The case for strict
scrutiny review is still strong,265 however, and it is the preferable
standard of review because of the greater level of protection it affords to
suspect classes.266
C. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
Preemption arguments have been utilized in several of the
nonimmigrant challenges. Several commentators have supported the use
of the supremacy clause as a method of striking down such laws.267 The
argument is that the federal government occupies the immigration field
in general, or at the very least, specific statutes on immigration
regulating the work of nonimmigrants preempt state restrictions in the
same area. Graham spoke to this issue when it held that “[s]tate laws
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of
their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”268 The Supreme
Court therefore held that immigration is an area traditionally occupied by
the federal government.269
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the federal
government’s supremacy in the immigration field in Arizona v. United
States.270 There the Court stated that “[t]he federal power to determine
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immigration policy is well settled.”271 The Court therefore struck down
several sections of an Arizona law dealing with immigration, holding
that “[t]he Federal Government has occupied the field of alien
registration” and as such “field preemption” prevented the states from
interfering.272 The Court struck down other sections of the law when
they were obstacles in the fulfillment of the purpose of Congress.273
Arizona stands as an affirmation of the overwhelming powers of
Congress to control immigration law, and the limited ability of states to
add additional restrictions on immigrants.274
The LeClerc and LULAC majorities accepted the federal
government’s power in the immigration field while arguing that federal
law would not actually preempt the challenged state laws.275 In LeClerc,
the Fifth Circuit dismissed the preemption argument, invoking both state
police powers and arguing that there could be harmonious regulation by
both the state and federal government.276 But as Arizona shows, the
Supreme Court may be less inclined to allow states to control in areas of
immigration than certain circuit courts have been.277 The Second Circuit
in Dandamudi reasoned that the federal government had control over the
field of immigration, and preemption by federal immigration law might
disallow even complementary state regulation.278 The court concluded
that because the visas involved are permission from the federal
government to work in a specific field, the INA would preempt state
laws restricting nonimmigrants from working in that field.279
The Supremacy Clause may not be the best way to eliminate states’
classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status, however, as
preemption challenges do not necessarily resolve whether all state
classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status are constitutional.
For example, some of the laws challenged in the circuit court cases
addressed state laws that restricted job licenses, which the work visa
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provisions in the INA might preempt.280 Another, however, involved
drivers’ licenses,281 which might fall outside the federal government’s
immigrations powers and more within the state’s powers. Additionally,
the court in Dandamudi did not strike down the New York license
restriction on preemption grounds because some of the plaintiffs had TN
visas, which precluded that argument.282 Therefore, while preemption
arguments are important in resolving state authority to regulate
nonimmigrants, they are not dispositive.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants
using strict scrutiny review.
Legal Permanent Residents and
nonimmigrants should receive the same treatment under the Equal
Protection Clause. Nonimmigrants have come to the United States
legally for a specified purpose, most commonly to continue their studies
or work in a specific field.283 Many stay for a significant period of time
before becoming legal permanent residents and eventually citizens.284
Yet, in several circuits nonimmigrants do not receive the same protection
under the law as LPRs.285 But they should. Nonimmigrants are as
deserving of the protection that strict scrutiny review affords because
they are a suspect class that fits into the category of a discrete and insular
minority.286 They face many of the same problems as LPRs and are just
as politically powerless, if not more so.287 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly granted them a lesser status than LPRs and has
implied that they deserve the same levels of protection.288 The Court’s
holding in Graham applies to alienage as a whole, not merely to LPRs.289
Therefore, there is clearly precedent to establish any law discriminating
against nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny review under
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the Equal Protection Clause. To do otherwise would fail to protect
vulnerable group and offer them far less protection than is afforded to
other similarly situated groups.

